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INTRODUCTION

This appeal stems from a contract dispute between Dr. Sara Skolnick and her former
employer, Exodus Healthcare Network, PLLC ("Exodus") regarding the payment of Dr.
Skolnick's wages. Dr. Skolnick began working for Exodus as an OB/GYN physician in
February 2014. The employment relationship was governed by a written contract which
obligated Exodus to pay Dr. Skolnick a bi-weekly salary.
At approximately the same time Dr. Skolnick signed her employment agreement
with Exodus, she also entered into a Recruitment Agreement with the local hospital, Jordan
Valley Medical Center, LP ("Jordan Valley"). Under this Recruitment Agreement, Jordan
Valley agreed to provide Exodus with a guaranteed monthly payment not to exceed
$39,630. The monthly payment amount was then to be reduced by the collections that
Exodus received for Dr. Skolnick's services the previous month.

Dr. Skolnick's

employment agreement also limited Exodus' use of the funds that Exodus received from
Jordan Valley. The employment agreement stated that the funds could only be used to pay
for Dr. Skolnick's salary and other expenses directly related to her services.
In December 2015, Jordan Valley suddenly and without notice stopped making its
monthly payments to Exodus in accordance with the Recruitment Agreement. However,
Exodus did not terminate Dr. Skolnick's employment at that time. Rather, it allowed Dr.
Skolnick to keep working and to provide services to its patients, which she did in
accordance with her employment agreement. Exodus also continued to send out bills to its
patients and their insurers so that it would be paid for Dr. Skolnick's services.
7
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Nevertheless, Exodus decided to stop paying Dr. Skolnick's salary in December 2014 even
though it continued to retain the benefits of her services.
In January 2015, and after Dr. Skolnick demanded payment of her salary, Exodus
received confirmation from Jordan Valley that no additional monthly payments would be

ti
forthcoming due to Dr. Skolnick's alleged breach of the Recruitment Agreement. Upon
receiving this, Exodus immediately terminated Dr. Skolnick's employment. It also refused
to pay any of the salary that Dr. Skolnick had earned over the previous seven weeks, even
though Exodus had continuously billed its patients for Dr. Skolnick's services during that
time. In doing so, Exodus asserted that the parties' employment agreement conditioned
the payment of Dr. Skolnick's salary on Exodus' receipt of Jordan Valley's monthly
payment. Since no such payments had been received for the previous two months, Exodus
believed that it was not obligated to pay Dr. Skolnick for the work she admittedly
performed during that time.
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Skolnick filed a complaint against Exodus for breach
of contract. The district court eventually determined that Exodus had breached the parties'
employment agreement when it refused to pay Dr. Skolnick for the work she performed
during her last seven weeks of employment. In doing so, the court correctly determined
that the employment agreement did not condition the payment of Dr. Skolnick's wages on
Exodus' receipt of Jordan Valley's monthly payment.

Rather, the agreement simply

limited Exodus' use of any monthly payment it received. Therefore, the court awarded Dr.

8
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Skolnick both her unpaid wages and her attorney's fees. Exodus is now appealing the
district court's ruling.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court properly determined that Exodus breached its

employment contract with Dr. Sara Skolnick where it was undisputed that (a) Dr. Skolnick
performed all the work she agreed to perform under her employment contract, and (b)
Exodus failed to pay Dr. Skolnick anything for the work she performed during the last
seven weeks of her employment. (R. at 1576-1690; 2146-2159).
This Court reviews a district court's decision to grant summary judgment for
correctness.

Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33,

if

10, 232 P.3d 1059.

The

interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law that this Court also reviews
for correctness. Hillcrest Inv. v. Sandy City, 2010 UT App 201, ,r 7,238 P.3d 1067.
2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Dr. Skolnick

most of the attorney fees identified in the declarations filed by her attorneys pursuant to
Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
"The standard of review on appeal of [the amount of] a trial court's award of attorney
fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P .2d 305, 316
(Utah 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

9
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
This case commenced on February 2, 2015, when appellee Sara Skolnick, M.D. filed

a complaint against appellant Exodus Healthcare Network, PLLC. (R. at 1-8)

The

complaint alleged that Exodus had breached its employment contract with Dr. Skolnick by
failing to pay Dr. Skolnick the wages she earned while working as a physician for Exodus
from November 22, 2014 through January 13, 2015. (Id.)
On July 6, 2015, Exodus moved the district court to consolidate Dr. Skolnick's
lawsuit with a separate lawsuit brought by Jordan Valley Medical Center against both
Exodus and Dr. Skolnick in Third District Court. (R. at 152-202). Jordan Valley's lawsuit
alleged that Dr. Skolnick had breached a hospital recruitment agreement and that Exodus
was jointly and severally liable for Dr. Skolnick's breach under the agreement's terms (R.
at 176). The district court ultimately granted Exodus' motion and consolidated Jordan's
Valley's lawsuit with the present case. (R. at 291 ).
On October 20, 2016, after the completion of discovery, Dr. Skolnick moved the
district court for summary judgment on her breach of contract claim against Exodus. (R.
at 1576). As part of her motion, Dr. Skolnick also sought attorney fees pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 34-27-1, which allows employees to recover attorney fees when they
successfully bring claims for unpaid wages. (Id)
On December 23, 2016, the district court held a hearing on Dr. Skolnick's motion
and took the matter under advisement. (R. at 2177). The district court subsequently issued

10
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a ruling on December 27, 2016, in which it granted Dr. Skolnick's summary judgment
motion and awarded her damages in the amount of $35,707.92. (R. at 2179-2199). The
court also determined that Dr. Skolnick was entitled to recover her attorney's fees, and it
instructed her to submit an affidavit of fees for the court to consider. (Id.)
On February 2, 2017, Dr. Skolnick filed a motion for attorney fees seeking fees in
the amount of $40,894.00. (R. at 2212). The motion was supported by a declaration
submitted by Dr. Skolnick's counsel. (R. at 2217). On this same day, Dr. Skolnick filed a
proposed judgment, which contained a blank space for the district court's final attorney fee
award. (R. at 2214). Eleven days later, on February 13, 2017, Dr. Skolnick's attorney filed
a supplemental declaration which identified an additional $1,805.50 in attorney fees that
had been billed to Dr. Skolnick during the previous month. (R. at 2233).
On February 16, 2017, two weeks after Dr. Skolnick filed her motion for attorney's
fees, the district court entered a final judgment for Dr. Skolnick in the amount of
$85,740.00. (R. at 2240). This judgment included an attorney fee award of $42,489.50,
"which [was] a slight reduction from that requested." (R. at 2241).
On the same day final judgment was entered, Exodus filed a Motion to Set Aside
Final Judgment along with a Response to Dr. Skolnick's Motion for Attorney Fees. (R. at
2245, 2301). In short, Exodus argued that the judgment should be set aside because it was
entered before Exodus' time to respond to Dr. Skolnick's motion for attorney's fees had
run. (R. at 2301 ). This argument was based on Exodus' mistaken belief that it had fourteen
days to respond to the motion pursuant to Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
11
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(R. at 2302). In turn, Exodus requested that the district court consider Exodus' objections
to Dr. Skolnick's fees before making a final attorney fee award. (Id.).
On February 28, 2017, less than fourteen days after Exodus filed its Motion to Set
Aside Final Judgment, the district court entered a ruling and order in which it agreed to
reconsider its previous attorney fee award. (R. at 2321). In doing so, the court also
mistakenly believed that Exodus should have been allowed a full fourteen days to respond
to Dr. Skolnick's motion for attorney's fees. (Id.) Based on the arguments presented by
Exodus in its response, the district court reduced its attorney fee award to $24,300. (Id.)
On March 2, 2017, Dr. Skolnick moved the district court to reconsider its February
28 Ruling and Order. (R. at 2316). The motion for reconsideration was filed because the
district court entered its ruling before the fourteen-day deadline for Dr. Skolnick's
opposition to Exodus' Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment. As such, Dr. Skolnick had
been denied an opportunity to present substantive legal arguments as to why the original

~

judgment and attorney fee award should have been allowed to stand.
Dr. Skolnick's primary argument was that Exodus' objections to her attorney fees
(i)

were untimely. (R. at 2317). Contrary to Exodus' representations to the court, Exodus did
not have fourteen days to object to Dr. Skolnick's fees. Rather, Exodus had only seven
days to object. See Utah R.Civ. P. 73(d) ("The court will enter an order for the claimed
amount [of attorney fees] unless another party objects within 7 days after the affidavit [of
fees] and proposed order are filed."). Therefore, Dr. Skolnick argued that Exodus waived
its ability to object to her attorney fees when it failed to file any objection within seven
12
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days of her attorney fee motion. (Id.) As a result, Dr. Skolnick argued that the district
court's original award of attorney fees should be reinstated. (Id.)
On March 2 7, 201 7, the district court entered a ruling and order in which it reinstated
its original Judgment from February 16, 2017, including its original attorney fee award of
$42,489.50.

(R. at 2360).

In doing so, the district court acknowledged that it was

"mistaken" in its belief that Exodus had fourteen days to file its objection to attorney's
fees. (Id.) Rather, the court determined that "any objection is governed by Rule 73, which
gave Exodus 7 days, not 14, to object." (R. at 2360-61). Based on this determination, the
court ruled that "the time to object had expired and the court properly signed the proposed
judgment." (R. at 2361).
II.

RELEVANTFACTS
A.

Dr. Skolnick's Employment Agreement with Exodus.

Exodus owns and operates a health care clinic located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
(R. at 1577). It employs physicians who provide a wide array of medical services to
patients, including primary family care, sports medicine, urgent care and general surgery.
(Id.)
In November 2013, Exodus entered into an employment contract with Dr. Sara

Skolnick, a licensed obstetrician and gynecologist ("OB/GYN"). (R. at 1577). The two
parties proceeded to sign a written three-year employment agreement that commenced on
February 1, 2014, and continued for three years following the commencement date. (R. at
1577, 1603). Under the agreement's terms, Dr. Skolnick was required to devote her
13
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"professional time, attention and skill as a medical doctor ... according to the work and
call schedule prepared by" Exodus. (R. at 1609). In exchange, Exodus agreed to pay Dr.
Skolnick an annual salary of $250,000 ($20,833 per month) during the first year of the
employment term. (R. at 1577, 1606). The salary was to be paid to Dr. Skolnick in
biweekly payments made on every other Friday of the month. (Id.) After the first year,
Dr. Skolnick's compensation converted from a straight salary to a productivity-based
compensation model. (Id.)
At approximately the same time Dr. Skolnick signed her employment agreement
with Exodus, she entered into a Recruitment Agreement with a local hospital, Jordan
Valley Medical Center. (R. at 1577, 1626). The agreement was designed to recruit Dr.
Skolnick into the hospital's service area due to a shortage of OB/GYN physicians. (R. at
1626). To do so, Jordan Valley agreed to provide one year of financial assistance so Dr.
Skolnick could efficiently transition into a full-time medical practice. (Id.) Specifically,
Jordan Valley agreed to provide Dr. Skolnick with a guaranteed monthly payment not to
exceed $39,630 (the "Guaranteed Monthly Amount"). (R. at 1578, 1606). This payment
was then reduced by an amount equal to the collections that Exodus received for Dr.
Skolnick' s services from the previous month. (Id)
Dr. Skolnick was not permitted to personally keep the Guaranteed Monthly Amount
she received from Jordan Valley. (R. at 1578, 1606). Rather, Dr. Skolnick's employment
agreement with Exodus required Dr. Skolnick to endorse or pay over to Exodus the entire
Guaranteed Monthly Amount. (Id.) The employment agreement also limited Exodus'

14
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ability to use the funds it received from Skolnick. The agreement stated that Exodus could
only use the Guaranteed Monthly Amount to pay Dr. Skolnick's salary and overhead for
the work she performed at Exodus. (Id.). As stated in the agreement:
3. COMPENSATION. Subject to the conditions set forth in this section,
[Exodus], as full payment for [Dr. Skolnick's] services rendered hereunder
and during the term of this Agreement:

Section 3.1, Hospital Recruitment Agreement. Physician [Dr. Skolnick]
has entered into a Recruitment Agreement to Existing Medical Practice
("Recruitment Agreement") with Jordan Valley Medical Center, LP, ...
("Hospital"), under which Physician is entitled to receive the following: (1)
a "Guaranteed Monthly Amount" of $39,583 .... All such payments shall be
made by Hospital directly to Physician as required by the Recruitment
Agreement. Provided, Physician shall then endorse over or pay to Company
[Exodus] all such amounts received from Hospital immediately upon receipt,
or as soon as reasonably practical thereafter. The parties agree that the
Guaranteed Monthly Amount of $39,583 shall be used by Company to pay
Physician's Monthly Base Compensation during the term of this Agreement
in accordance with Section 3 .2.. . . The intent of the above provision is to
ensure that all such payments are paid by [Exodus] in accordance with
Exhibit C, Guarantee, and Attachment A, Initial Expense Worksheet, to the
Recruitment Agreement in calculating the final reconciliation set forth in
Exhibit C to the Recruitment Agreement.
(R. at 1578, 1605-06). This payment arrangement was designed to comply with federal
Anti-Kickback laws, which generally prohibit hospitals from offering anything of value
directly to a medical practice in an effort to reward or induce the referral of patients to the
hospital. (R. at 1863); 42 U.S.C. § 1320-7b.
While Dr. Skolnick's employment agreement had a three-year term, it also allowed
either party to terminate the agreement, with or without cause, by giving at least 90 days'
prior written notice to the other party. (R. at 1578, 1616). The agreement further stated
15
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that if Dr. Skolnick gave proper notice and terminated the agreement, Exodus was entitled
to terminate Dr. Skolnick's employment immediately. (Id.) If Exodus chose to do so, Dr.
Skolnick was entitled to receive her monthly compensation through the last day of her
employment. (Id.) As stated in the agreement:

Section 8.6, Voluntary Termination By Either Party. During the term of
this Agreement, either party may terminate Physician's employment
hereunder, with or without cause, by giving at least ninety (90) calendar days'
prior written notice (titled as a "Notice of Termination" for such "required
period") to the other party. This Agreement shall terminate at the end of such
required period. Provided, Company in its sole and absolute discretion may,
any time after providing or receipt of the Notice of Termination, terminate
Physician's employment or otherwise suspend Physician from providing
further services on behalf of Company for part or all of this required period.
In such case, Physician shall receive Physician's Monthly Compensation, if
any, accrued through the last day of employment, determined and paid in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3 and the lead paragraph to this
Section 8 ....

(Id).
From February through November 2014, Dr. Skolnick received her Guaranteed
Monthly Amount from Jordan Valley, as provided in her Recruitment Agreement with the
hospital. (R. at 1579). Dr. Skolnick also endorsed every payment she received from Jordan
Valley over to Exodus, as required by her Employment Agreement. (Id.) However,
beginning in the month of December 2014, Jordan Valley suddenly and without notice
stopped paying the Guaranteed Monthly Amount to Dr. Skolnick. (Id.) As a result, Dr.
Skolnick did not receive any payments from the hospital after November 25, 2014. (Id.)

16
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B.

Dr. Skolnick's Separation from Exodus.

On December 1, 2014, and pursuant to the terms of her employment agreement, Dr.
Skolnick sent an email to Exodus' owner, Dr. Brian Zehnder, stating that she was providing
90-day written notice of her intent to terminate her employment with Exodus effective
February 28, 2015. (R. at 1579). However, after providing such notice, Dr. Skolnick
continued to show up for work as she was regularly scheduled to do. (Id.) She continued
to take call at the hospital for her pregnant patients and perform diagnostics and procedures
for her patients. (Id.) Moreover, Exodus continued to send out bills for the services and
procedures that Dr. Skolnick provided to Exodus' patients. (Id)
Even though Dr. Skolnick continued to perform her work duties, and even though
Exodus continued to send out bills for her services, Exodus did not pay any salary to Dr.
Skolnick after it received her 90-day termination notice. (R. at 1580). The last check that
Dr. Skolnick received from Exodus was dated December 6, 2014 and was for the two-week
pay period of November 22 through December 6, 2014.

(Id.)

However, Exodus

subsequently stopped payment on this check before it could be deposited.

(Id.)

Dr.

Skolnick did not receive any payments from Exodus whatsoever after December 6, 2014.

(Id.) As a result, Dr. Skolnick sent the following letter to Dr. Zehnder on January 12, 2015:
Dear Dr. Zehnder,

I have not been paid since December 4, 2014 nor have I received checks from
IASIS [aka Jordan Valley] for December or January that I would tum over
to EHN [Exodus]. I have received accounting statements that EHN has
processed for my collections for November and December. I have continued
17
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working and taking call during this time and will continue to do so. Please
issue paychecks for the appropriate pay periods forthwith.
Sara Skolnick, MD
(R. at 1580).
On January 13, 2015, Dr. Zehnder received an email letter from Jordan Valley's
CEO, Steven Anderson, regarding Dr. Skolnick's Guaranteed Monthly Amount. (R. at
1580). In the email, Mr. Anderson stated that Jordan Valley had decided to terminate the
Guaranteed Monthly Amount it had been paying to Dr. Skolnick under her Recruitment
Agreement based on its belief that Dr. Skolnick was not fulfilling her obligations under the
Recruitment Agreement. (Id.)
On the same day he received Mr. Anderson's email, Dr. Zehnder drafted a letter to
Dr. Skolnick which stated that Exodus was terminating Dr. Skolnick's employment
effective immediately. (R. at 1581). The letter was delivered to Dr. Skolnick by Exodus'
office manager, Gordon Stipanovich, on January 13, 2015. (Id.). In his letter, Dr. Zehnder
stated that the grounds for Dr. Skolnick's termination were as follows:
Unfortunately, [Exodus's office manager] Gordon Stipanovich was informed
yesterday by [Jordan Valley COO] Jon Butterfield and [Jordan Valley CEO]
Steve Anderson that there would be no further Recruitment Assistance from
the hospital, and that the current Assistance checks from November and
December would not be forthcoming to cover your overhead, including
payroll. Based on this action, it is clear that the hospital feels that you have
violated one or more conditions of the Recruitment Agreement.

*

*

*

Based on the above, your employment with Exodus is terminated
immediately.

18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R. at 1581). As part of his termination letter, Dr. Zehnder also stated that "[w]e do believe
that you should receive compensation through the end of your employment, January 13,
2015."
Dr. Skolnick was never paid by Exodus for any of the work she performed from
November 22, 2014 through January 13, 2015. (R. at 1580). Under the terms of her
employment agreement, Dr. Skolnick was entitled to receive $35,707.92 in salary for this
period. (Id.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court must affirm the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on
Dr. Skolnick's claim for breach of contract against Exodus, including the district court's
award of attorney's fees. There is no dispute that Dr. Skolnick performed all of her work
duties during her last seven weeks of employment with Exodus and that Exodus refused to
pay her for such work. Moreover, the parties' employment agreement did not condition
the payment of Dr. Skolnick's salary on Exodus' receipt of Jordan Valley's monthly
payment. Rather, the agreement simply limited Exodus' use of any monthly payment it
did receive. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Exodus breached the
parties' employment agreement when it refused to pay Dr. Skolnick.
In addition, the district court's attorney fee award did not constitute a clear abuse of
discretion. In fact, Exodus waived its ability to challenge such fees when it failed to object
to Dr. Skolnick's attorney fee declaration within the timeframe set forth in Rule 73, Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, such fees were reasonable given the circumstances
of this case. Therefore, the district court's award of attorney's fees must be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I.

EXODUS BREACHED ITS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH DR.
SKOLNICK BY REFUSING TO PAY HER FOR THE WORK EXODUS
ADMITS SHE PERFORMED.
A.

Standard of Review

Exodus is appealing the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor
of Dr. Skolnick on her breach of contract claim for unpaid wages. Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R.Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view all facts and
the reasonable inferences to be made therefrom in a light favorable to the non-moving
party. Morra v. Grand County, 2010 UT 21,

,r 12, 230 P.3d 1022.

This Court reviews a

district court's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness. Gudmundson v. Del

Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ,r 10, 232 P.3d 1059.
When considering a summary judgment motion that requires the interpretation of a
written contract, courts "first look to the writing alone to determine its meaning and the
intent of the contracting parties." Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2,

,r 44,

201 P.3d 966. "If the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and
20
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the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Nolin v. S&S Const., Inc., 2013 UT
App 94, ,r 12, 301 P.3d 1026, 1029.

B.

The Employment Agreement Required Exodus to Pay Dr. Skolnick For
All the Work She Performed in December 2014 and January 2015.

The district court properly determined that Exodus breached the relevant
employment agreement when it refused to pay Dr. Skolnick for the work she performed
for Exodus in December 2014 and January 2015. This is because it was undisputed that
Dr. Skolnick fulfilled all her contractual obligations during this period. As such, there was
no legal justification for Exodus' decision to withhold Dr. Skolnick's wages.
Under the terms of her employment agreement with Exodus, which commenced on
February 1, 2014, Dr. Skolnick agreed to devote her "professional time, attention and skill
as a medical doctor ... according to the work and call schedule prepared by" Exodus. (R.
at 1609). She was also required to endorse and turn over to Exodus all the Guaranteed
Monthly Amounts she received from Jordan Valley pursuant to her Hospital Recruitment
Agreement. (R. at 1606).

In exchange, Exodus agreed to pay Dr. Skolnick an annual

salary of $250,000 ($20,833 per month) during the first year of the employment term. (Id.).
The salary was to be paid to Dr. Skolnick in biweekly payments made on every other Friday
of the month. (Id.)
It is undisputed that Dr. Skolnick fulfilled all her contractual obligations while

working for Exodus, including the period for which Exodus refused to pay Dr. Skolnick.
Dr. Skolnick did notify Exodus on December 1, 2014 that she would terminating her
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employment in 90-days. (R. at 1579). However, this was something she was entitled to
do under the voluntary termination provision in her employment contract. (R. at 1616).
More importantly, Dr. Skolnick continued in good faith to show up to work and perform
her duties for Exodus as a physician. (R. at 1579). For example, she continued to perform
diagnostics and procedures and to take call at the hospital. (Id) In fact, Exodus continued
to bill its patients and their insurers for all the services and procedures that Dr. Skolnick
provided to her patients. (Id)
In addition, Dr. Skolnick endorsed and turned over to Exodus all the Guaranteed
Monthly Amounts she received from Jordan Valley, as her employment agreement
required. (R. at 1579). She endorsed and turned over the monthly checks she received
from Exodus for the months of February through November 2014. (Id.). After November
2014, she did not receive any further checks from Jordan Valley. (Id.) As such, she was
unable to tum over any further checks to Exodus. However, Dr. Skolnick never kept any
of Jordan Valley's Guaranteed Monthly Amounts for herself.
Despite having fulfilled all her contractual obligations, Dr. Skolnick was never paid
for the work she performed after providing her 90-day termination notice to Exodus. (R.
at 1580). In fact, the last check that Dr. Skolnick received from Exodus was dated
December 6, 2014 and was for the two-week pay period of November 22 through
December 6, 2014. (Id.) However, Exodus subsequently stopped payment on this check
before it could be deposited. (Id) In short, Exodus never paid Dr. Skolnick for any of the
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work she performed after November 21, 2014 even though Exodus billed and collected for
all her services.
It must be emphasized that Dr. Skolnick never agreed to forego her salary from
Exodus. To the contrary, she sent an email to Exodus' owner in early January 2015 in
which she stated "I have not been paid since December 4, 2014.... I have continued
working and taking call during this time and will continue to do so. Please issue paychecks
for the appropriate pay periods forthwith." (R. at 1580).
Exodus subsequently terminated Dr. Skolnick's employment on January 13, 2014
after receiving a letter from Jordan Valley which memorialized the hospital's decision to
terminate the Guaranteed Monthly Amount it had been paying to Dr. Skolnick under her
Recruitment Agreement. (R. at 1580). Exodus then terminated Dr. Skolnick via a handdelivered letter, which its owner concluded by stating that "[w]e do believe that you should
receive compensation through the end of your employment, January 13, 2015." (R. at
1581).
Despite its owner's admission that Dr. Skolnick was entitled to be paid for her work,
Exodus subsequently refused to pay Dr. Skolnick for all the work performed after
November 21, 2014.

Exodus apparently believed that it was not obligated to pay Dr.

Skolnick unless and until it received the Guaranteed Monthly Amount that Dr. Skolnick
forwarded from the hospital. However, Dr. Skolnick did not personally retain any monthly
checks from Jordan Valley after November 2014. Rather, it was Jordan Valley that stopped
making the payments.

Moreover, and as will be discussed more fully below, her
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employment agreement with Exodus did not require Dr. Skolnick to work for free if Jordan
Valley stopped making its monthly payments. Her wages were not contingent on the acts
of a third party if she otherwise performed the work she was required to do. This is
especially true where Exodus continued to bill and receive compensation for the services
Dr. Skolnick provided after November 2014.
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Skolnick is entitled to summary judgment on her wage
claim. There is no dispute that she was not paid for services and procedures she performed
in December 2014 and January 2015 in accordance with the terms of her employment
agreement. Nowhere does the employment contract state that Dr. Skolnick is required to
work for free. Therefore, Dr. Skolnick is entitled to a judgment for the wages due and
owing to her from Exodus.
C.

Dr. Skolnick Did Not Agree to Work for Free in the Event Jordan Valley
Stopped Making the Guaranteed Monthly Payment.

In its opening brief, Exodus argues that it was not required to compensate Dr.
Skolnick for the physician services she provided in December 2014 and January 2015. It
argues that the parties' employment agreement only required Exodus to pay Dr. Skolnick
in the event Exodus first received the Guaranteed Monthly Amount from Jordan Valley
that Dr. Skolnick was required to pay over to Exodus. In other words, Exodus believes
that that its receipt of the Guaranteed Monthly Amount was a condition precedent to its
obligation to pay Dr. Skolnick's salary. However, Exodus' argument is inconsistent with
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the employment agreement's terms, which clearly do not relieve Exodus of its obligation
to pay Dr. Skolnick in such circumstances.
When interpreting a contract, courts "first look to the writing alone to determine its
meaning and the intent of the contracting parties." Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp.,
2009 UT 2,144,201 P.3d 966. "If the language within the four comers of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Nolin v. S &

S Const., Inc., 2013 UT App 94, 112, 301 P.3d 1026. A contract is ambiguous if it there is
more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies. Cafe Rio, Inc. V Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009
UT6, 125.
In this case, the district court properly determined that the parties' employment
agreement is not ambiguous with respect to Exodus' obligation to pay Dr. Skolnick for the
services she provided to Exodus' patients. The relevant provision of the contract states as
follows:
3. COMPENSATION. Subject to the conditions set forth in this section,
[Exodus], as full payment for [Dr. Skolnick's] services rendered hereunder
and during the term of this Agreement:

~

Section 3.1, Hospital Recruitment Agreement. [Dr. Skolnick] has entered
into a Recruitment Agreement to Existing Medical Practice ("Recruitment
Agreement") with Jordan Valley Medical Center, LP, ... ("Hospital"), under
which Physician is entitled to receive the following: (1) a "Guaranteed
Monthly Amount" of $39,583 .... All such payments shall be made by
Hospital directly to [Dr. Skolnick] as required by the Recruitment
Agreement. Provided, [Dr. Skolnick] shall then endorse over or pay to
25
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[Exodus] all such amounts received from Hospital immediately upon receipt,
or as soon as reasonably practical thereafter. The parties agree that the
Guaranteed Monthly Amount of $39,583 shall be used by {Exodus] to pay
[Dr. Skolnick'sj Monthly Base Compensation during the term of this
Agreement in accordance with Section 3.2... The intent of the above
provision is to ensure that all such payments are paid by [Exodus] in
accordance with Exhibit C, Guarantee, and Attachment A, Initial Expense
Worksheet, to the Recruitment Agreement in calculating the final
reconciliation set forth in Exhibit C to the Recruitment Agreement.
(R. at 1578, 1605-06) (emphasis added).
Exodus claims that the language highlighted above created a condition precedent
that conditioned th~ payment of Dr. Skolnick's salary on Exodus's receipt of the
Guaranteed Monthly Amount.

However, as the district court correctly determined, this

language does not impose any conditions on the payment of Dr. Skolnick's salary beyond
the performance of her work duties. Rather, the language simply creates a covenant that
limits Exodus' use of the Guaranteed Monthly Amount it received from Dr. Skolnick.
The Utah Supreme Court explained the distinction between covenants and
conditions precedent in McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 UT 22,274 P.3d
981. It stated that a covenant is a "promise[] between the parties to the contract about their
mutual obligations ...." Id. at ,r 28 (quoting Howard 0. Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts,
§ 10:1 (2012). In contrast, a condition is "an event, not certain to occur, which must occur
. . . before performance under a contract becomes due." Id. at ,r 29 (quoting Restatement
(Second) Of Contracts§ 224 (1981)). The court further explained the proper way to
distinguish a covenant from a condition, stating that:
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The determination whether a given contractual provision is a covenant or a
condition is generally a question of the intent of the parties to the contract.
"Words such as 'on condition that,' 'if,' and 'provided,' are words of
condition, and in the absence of indication to the contrary, the employment
of such words in a contract creates conditions precedent."
Id. at,J 32.

Contrary to Exodus' argument, Section 3.1 of the parties' employment agreement
does not impose a condition precedent on Exodus' obligation to pay Dr. Skolnick's salary.
It does not contain any "words of condition" which state that Exodus is only required to
pay Dr. Skolnick her salary "if' or "on the condition that" Jordan Valley makes its monthly
payment to Dr. Skolnick. Rather, the provision simply imposes limits on how Exodus may
use any monthly payments it receives from Dr. Skolnick and Jordan Valley. As such,
Exodus' obligation to pay Dr. Skolnick was not predicated upon the receipt of any
payments from Jordan Valley.
Ci}

Moreover, the contract explains why the parties wanted to limit Exodus' use of the
Guaranteed Monthly Amount. It states that "[t]he intent of the above provision is to ensure
that all such payments are paid by [Exodus] in accordance with . . . the Recruitment
Agreement in calculating the final reconciliation [ 1] set forth in Exhibit C to the
Recruitment Agreement." (R. at 1606). In other words, the Employment Agreement itself

As explained in the Statement of Relevant Facts, Dr. Skolnick's Recruitment
Agreement entitled her to receive a Guaranteed Monthly Amount equal to $39,630 minus
the amount of collections that Exodus received for Dr. Skolnick's services from the
previous month. (R. at 1606). This required a "final reconciliation" to be performed by
Exodus and Jordan Valley within seventy-five days after the end of the Recruitment
Agreement's term. (R. at 1683).
27
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explains that the parties' intent was to limit Exodus' use of any money received indirectly
from Jordan Valley. Nowhere does the contract state that the parties intended to limit
Exodus' duty to pay Dr. Skolnick's salary.
There are additional reasons why the employment contract would have limited
Exodus' use of guaranteed payments. Exodus admits that the reason the employment
agreement required Exodus to use Jordan Valley's guaranteed payments to pay Dr.
Skolnick's salary was "to comply with the federal Stark and Anti-Kickback laws." (R. at
1863). This is true, because the Anti-Kickback statute generally prohibits hospitals from
offering anything of value to medical practices in an effort to reward or induce the referral
of patients to the hospital. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320-7b. Under this criminal statute, Jordan
Valley would generally be prohibited from paying anything of value to Exodus because
such payments could be construed as an inducement for Exodus to refer patients for whom
Jordan Valley could bill its hospital services.
However, there is an exception to the Anti-Kickback statute that allows hospitals to
provide referral sources with money in order to "induce any ... practitioner to relocate his
(il

or her primary place of practice" into a medically underserved area, provided that certain
requirements are met. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(n). One of these requirements is that "[t]he
payment ... of anything of value may not directly or indirectly benefit any person (other
than the practitioner being recruited) or entity in a position to make or influence referrals
to the entity providing the recruitment payments .... " 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(n)(9). In other
words, Jordan Valley was permitted to provide Exodus with money to recruit Dr. Skolnick
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

into Jordan Valley's service area, provided that the money was used to pay Dr. Skolnick
and not costs related to Exodus' general operations and overhead.
The fact is that Dr. Skolnick's recruitment agreement never conditions the payment
of her salary upon Exodus' receipt of the guaranteed payments.

Rather, the agreement

expressly states that she is to receive her salary "in biweekly payments ... payable every
other Friday of the month." (R. at 1606). Moreover, the parties could have very easily
chosen to include "words of condition" that would have conditioned Exodus' obligation to
pay Dr. Skolnick on its receipt of the guaranteed payments. They chose not to do so.
Therefore, Exodus was obligated to pay Dr. Skolnick for the work she performed regardless
of whether it ever received the guaranteed payments from Jordan Valley.
Based on the foregoing, Exodus did breach Dr. Skolnick's employment agreement
when it failed to pay Dr. Skolnick for her last seven weeks of work. Dr. Skolnick did
Gj

everything that was required of her under the agreement, including the endorsement of
every check she received from Jordan Valley over to Exodus. Therefore, there is no
justification for Exodus' refusal to pay Dr. Skolnick and its decision to do so constituted a

Gil

breach of contract.

D.

Exodus Has Failed to Establish a "Frustration of Purpose" or
"Impossibility" Defense.

As part of its opening brief, Exodus also argues that it was not obligated to pay Dr.
Skolnick for her last seven weeks of work because "Jordan Valley's failure to provide
Guaranteed Monthly Amount payments frustrated the very purposed of the Recruitment
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Agreement and Employment Agreement and excused Exodus' performance." (Appellant's
Brief at 19). However, this argument must be rejected because (1) Exodus has never
asserted impracticability, impossibility or frustration as affirmative defenses, and (2)
Exodus has failed to provide any evidence which shows that Jordan Valley's actions made
it impossible for Exodus to pay Dr. Skolnick.
Exodus has Never Previously Asserted Impracticability, Impossibility
or Frustration as Affirmative Defenses.
Utah courts have recognized that the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability and
frustration of purposes are contractual defenses. See, e.g., Tech Center 2000, LLC v. ZRIL
LLC, 2015 UT App 281, ,r,r 29-32, 363 P.3d 566. As such, Exodus was required to include

these defenses in its Answer in order to assert them as bases to avoid liability. See Utah
R.Civ. P. 8(c) ("A party must set forth affirmatively in a responsive pleading ... any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.").
A review of Exodus' Answer reveals that it failed to assert the affirmative defenses
of impracticability, impossibility or frustration in response to Dr. Skolnick's claims. (R.
at 210-45). Therefore, Exodus is now precluded from asserting these defenses in response
to Dr. Skolnick' s summary judgment motion. See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.,
2003 UT 57,

,r 12, 84 P.3d 1154 (stating that affirmative defenses must be affirmatively

pleaded in order to clearly frame the issues to be tried).
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2.
Gi)

Exodus Has Failed to Meet its Burden of Establishing Frustration of
Purpose or Impossibility Defenses.

Even if Exodus had properly asserted impossibility or frustration as affirmative
defenses, its reliance on these defenses must still be rejected. This is because Exodus failed
to meet its burden of proving that these defenses apply to Dr. Skolnick's employment
agreement.
As an initial matter, Exodus' argument seems to conflate the concepts of
impossibility and frustration of purpose, when in fact they are separate defenses that
address different scenarios. "Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation
is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and
without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation
impossible or highly impracticable." Kilgore Pavement Maint., LLC v. West Jordan City,
2011 UT App 165,

,r 9,

257 P.3d 460 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

"Frustration of purpose differs from the defense of impossibility only in that performance
of the promise, rather than being impossible or impracticable, is instead pointless." Western

Props. v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P .2d 656, 659 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). "The
applicability of this doctrine depends on the total or nearly total destruction of the purpose
for which, in the contemplation of both parties, the transaction was made." Castagna v.

Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1283 (Utah 1976).
In this case, Exodus is not arguing that its employment agreement with Dr. Skolnick
became "pointless" or no longer served a purpose after Jordan Valley stopped making its
31

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

payments. Rather, it argues that Jordan Valley's decision to stop making its guaranteed
payments made it impractical for Exodus to pay Dr. Skolnick. Therefore, it appears Exodus
is actually asserting an impossibility defense, as opposed to a frustration of purpose
defense.
As with any affirmative defense, Exodus has the burden of proving every element
necessary to establish that its obligation to pay Dr. Skolnick was excused under the doctrine
of impossibility. Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996). Exodus failed to do
so. Most importantly, it has failed to show that Jordan Valley's decision to stop making
the monthly guaranteed payment made it "impossible or highly impracticable" for it pay
Dr. Skolnick for the work she performed. Kilgore, 2011 UT App 165 at, 9. For example,
Exodus did not provide any evidence regarding its finances or assets to prove that it had
no money to pay Dr. Skolnick. See Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 69 (Utah 1982)
(" [T]he frustration must be substantial. It is not enough that the transaction has become
less profitable for the affected party or even that he will sustain a loss."). To the contrary,
Exodus admitted that it continued to send out bills for the services and procedures that Dr.
Skolnick provided to Exodus' patients during time for which it refused to pay her. (R. at
1579). Therefore, it is not enough for Exodus to make conclusory statements that its
performance was impossible or impractical.

Rather, it must have shown a complete

inability to pay Dr. Skolnick in the absence of Jordan Valley's payments. See, e.g.,
Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) (Rejecting
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impossibility defense based on excessive rise in operating costs where defendant failed to
produce evidence showing such costs made it impossible to service the plaintiffs).
Based on the foregoing, the court must reject Exodus' use of the impossibility or
frustration of purpose doctrines as defenses to liability. First, it failed to place the parties
on notice that it would be asserting this defense by failing to include it as an affirmative
defense in its Answer.

Second, and more substantively, it has failed to provide any

evidence that it was impossible for it to pay Dr. Skolnick's salary once Jordan Valley's
payments stopped.

Therefore, Exodus should be found liable for breaching the

employment agreement based on its failure to pay Dr. Skolnick for all the work she
performed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ATTORNEY FEE AWARD WAS PROPER.

Even if this Court upholds the district court's granting of summary judgment in Dr.
Skolnick's favor, Exodus has asked this Court to reverse the district court's order granting
Dr. Skolnick her attorney fees. First, Exodus argues that the district court erred when it
ruled that Exodus failed to make a timely objection to the attorney fee declaration
submitted by Dr. Skolnick's counsel. Second, Exodus argues that the district court erred
when it failed to consider Exodus' objections to Dr. Skolnick's supplemental attorney fee
declaration. Finally, Exodus claims that the district court should have disallowed the
recovery of a portion of Dr. Skolnick's fees because they were related to the claims of
Jordan Valley. However, and for the reasons stated below, this Court must reject Exodus'
arguments and uphold the district court's attorney fee award.
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A.

Under Rule 73, Exodus Had Seven Days Within Which to Object to the
Declaration of Attorney Fees.

The district court properly determined that Exodus waived its ability to object to Dr.
Skolnick's attorney fees when Exodus failed to object to such fees within the seven-day
period set forth in Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Contrary to Exodus'
argument, Rule 73 does not provide two different methods for requesting attorney fees.
Rather, the Rule states that "[a]ttorney fees must be claimed by filing a motion for attorney
fees no later than 14 days after the judgment is entered .... " Utah R. Civ. P. 73 (a) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, " [t]he motion must be supported by an affidavit or declaration that
reasonably describes the time spent and work performed .... " Utah R.Civ. P. 73(c). Finally,
if the court has previously established liability for fees, the party claiming the fees may file
both an affidavit and a proposed order. Utah R.Civ. P. 73(d). In such instances, "[t]he
court will enter an order for the claimed amount unless another party objects within 7 days
after the affidavit and proposed order are filed." Id.
The plain language of Rule 73 clearly provides only one method by which to claim
attorney fees - "a motion."

Utah R.Civ. P. 73(d).

The language in subsection (d)

addressing instances in which a court has previously established liability for fees does not
change this requirement. For example, it does not state that a party need "only" to file an
affidavit if liability was previously established. Rather, the rule states that an affidavit
"must" be filed in connection with every motion for attorney fees. Utah R.Civ. P. 73(c).
What subsection (d) does state is that a party may file both an affidavit and a proposed
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order for fees where liability for such fees has been previously established. Utah R.Civ. P.
73(d). In such instances, the opposing party then has seven days within which to object.
Id. If no such objection is filed, the district court is then required to enter an order for the

claimed amount. Id. ("The court will enter an order for the claimed amount unless another
party objects within 7 days after the affidavit and proposed order are filed.") (emphasis
added).
In this case, Dr. Skonick complied with all the foregoing requirements when she
submitted her request for attorney's fee to the district court. First, she filed a motion for
attorney's fees prior to the entry of final judgment. (R. at 2212). The motion simply
referenced the district court's previous ruling in which it determined that Dr. Skolnick was
entitled to recover her fees. (ld.) Second, Dr. Skolnick's motion was accompanied by a
Declaration of Attorney Fees from her attorney which set forth the claimed amount and
other necessary information. (R. at 2217). Finally, since Exodus' liability for attorney's
fees had been previously established, Dr. Skolnick submitted a proposed order in the form
of a judgment that contained a blank space for the court's final attorney fee award. (R. at
2214).
Since liability had been previously established, Exodus had seven days within which
to object to Dr. Skolnick's attorney fees. Utah R.Civ. P. 73(d). It admittedly failed to meet
this deadline. As such, Rule 73(d) required the district court to enter an order for all the
attorney's fees claimed by Dr. Skolnick. Therefore, the district court's attorney fee award
to Dr. Skolnick must be affirmed.
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B.

Dr. Skolnick's Supplemental Attorney Fee Declaration Did Not Raise
Any New Issues and Did Not Trigger a Separate Deadline.

Exodus argues that the district court erred when it failed to consider Exodus'
objections to the supplemental declaration filed by Dr. Skolnick's attorney.

This

supplemental declaration simply identified an additional $1,805.00 in fees that had been
incurred by Dr. Skolnick during the previous month and which were not included in the
original declaration.

It did not raise any substantive issues that were not set forth

previously in the original declaration.
By failing to object to Dr. Skolnick's original motion for attorney's fees within the
applicable 7-day period, Exodus waived its ability to challenge the attorney fee award
altogether.

As such, it was within the district court's discretion to consider the

supplemental declaration when entering its judgment.
Alternatively, and in the event this Court believes that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to consider Exodus' objections to the supplemental declaration, the
remedy is to simply reduce the court's attorney fee award by $1,805.00. However, there
is no basis for this Court to reconsider the remaining $40,684.50 which the district court
awarded to Dr. Skolnick, as Exodus clearly waived its ability to object to those fees by
failing to file a timely objection.
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C.

Dr. Skolnick Did Provide the District Court with a Basis Upon Which to
Award Her Attorney Fees That Were Partially Related to Jordan
Valley's Claims.

Finally, Exodus claims that the district court erred when it vacated its February 28,
2017 Ruling and Order ("February 28 Ruling") and entered a final judgment which
awarded $42,489.50 in attorney's fees to Dr. Skolnick. In doing so, Exodus claims that the
district court did not consider Exodus' argument that a portion of these fees should have
~

been apportioned to Jordan Valley's claims against Dr. Skolnick. As support for its
position, Exodus claims that Dr. Skolnick never argued that the district court's February
28 Ruling was incorrect and therefore the district court's subsequent decision to vacate the
ruling must have been based entirely on procedural grounds.
Exodus' claim that Dr. Skolnick never presented any arguments as to why fees
related to Jordan Valley's claims should be included in the attorney fee award is wrong.
Two days after the court entered its February 28 Ruling, Dr. Skolnick filed a motion in
which she asked the court to reconsider this ruling. (R. at 2316). She did so because the
court had entered its February 28 Ruling less than 14-days after Exodus filed the underlying
motion to set aside the district court's original judgment. As such, Dr. Skolnick had been
deprived an opportunity to respond to Exodus' arguments regarding the apportionment of
fees.
As part of her motion for reconsideration, and contrary to Exodus' representations
to this Court, Dr. Skolnick did present a comprehensive argument as to why she should be
awarded attorney's fees that were related to Jordan Valley's claims. (R. at 2319-21). Dr.
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Skolnick argued that the two claims were intensely intertwined, thus making it
inappropriate to apportion fees between the two claims. (Id.) In doing so, Dr. Skolnick
cited language from a memorandum Exodus had previously filed wherein Exodus
requested that Jordan Valley's claims be consolidated with Dr. Skolnick's claims:
The Dr. Skolnick Action and the Jordan Valley Action involve interrelated
agreements and the parties are asserting claims against each other for the
exact same events and even the same damages. Because the Recruitment
Agreement [between Skolnick and Jordan Valley] and the Employment
Agreement [between Skolnick and Exodus] are interrelated and provide the
basis for both the Dr. Skolnick Action, the critical witnesses and evidence
presented in each case will largely be the same. Witnesses will testify in both
cases in order to explain how each agreement was formed, the procedure by
which Dr. Skolnick was paid under the agreements in order to evaluate her
wage claim, and the factual circumstances that precipitated the alleged
breach of the agreements.
(R. at 2319-20) (quoting R. at 162).

In other words, Exodus had previously admitted that most of the discovery the
parties would need to conduct would relate to both claims, including the same witnesses
and documents. Therefore, since the bulk of the attorney's fees that Dr. Skolnick sought
to recover were discovery-related, it necessarily followed that such fees related directly to
Dr. Skolnick's wage claim against Exodus, as well as Jordan Valley's claims against Dr.
Skolnick. As such, Dr. Skolnick argued that there was no basis for the district court to
allocate the fees between the two claims.
Dr. Skolnick also drew the court's attention to the fact that Exodus had relied on the
dispute between Dr. Skolnick and Jordan Valley as the basis for its decision not to pay Dr.
Skolnick for her work. (R. at 2920). Indeed, Exodus still maintains on appeal that the
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contractual dispute between Dr. Skolnick and Jordan Valley, along with Jordan Valley's
refusal to pay the guaranteed monthly payment, relieved Exodus of its obligation to pay a
salary to Dr. Skolnick after December 1, 2014. Therefore, it is insincere for Exodus now
to claim that Jordan Valley's claims are somehow unrelated to Exodus' wage claims.
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Skolnick did provide the district court with a substantive
basis upon which to vacate its February 28 Ruling and award Dr. Skolnick all the attorney's
fees which the court awarded to her in its original judgment. Moreover, district courts are
given broad discretion in determining what an appropriate attorney fee award should be.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,316 (Utah 1998) (Standard for reviewing the amount
of an attorney fee award is "patent error or clear abuse of discretion.") Therefore, since
there was a basis for the district court's decision to vacate its February 28 Ruling, the
court's final attorney fee award should be affirmed by this Court.
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
"[W]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 'the party is
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal."' Valcarce, 961 P .2d at 319 (quoting
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). In this
case, the district court awarded Dr. Skolnick her attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.§ 34-27-1, which allows employees to recover attorney fees when they successfully
bring claims for unpaid wages. Exodus has not challenged the district court's application
of this statute on appeal. Therefore, Dr. Skolnick also is entitled to recover the attorney's
fees she has incurred in defending herself against Exodus' appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Dr. Skolnick respectfully requests that this Court affirm
both the district court's granting of summary judgment in Dr. Skolnick's favor and the
district court's subsequent attorney fee award. Dr. Skolnick further requests an award for
the attorney's fees she has incurred on appeal.
DATED this 15th day of December 2017.

RESNICK & LOUIS, PC

By:
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Attorneys for Dr. Sara Skolnick
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